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1Hierarchies, Incentives and Collusion in a Model of Enforcement
Abstract
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible enforcers in an agency framework.
We examine how supervisor’s choice of effort and honesty are influenced by incentives (penalty
and reward schemes) and organizational structure. We consider both vertical hierarchies (corrupt
supervisor monitoring another) and horizontal structures where more than one corrupt supervisor
monitor the agent. The latter tend to induce less corruption but need not welfare dominate the
vertical hierarchies. The organizational structure matters most when there are constraints on
rewards and penalties.
Key Words: corruption, hierarchies, monitoring
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2Hierarchies, Incentives and Collusion in a Model of Enforcement
I. INTRODUCTION
 
 Many agency relationships (government-tax payer, regulator-firm) rely on intermediate
agents (supervisors/officers) to seek agent-related information, which is essential to the
implementation of the incentive scheme. The possibility that these supervisors can collude with the
agents and distort or hide relevant information to further their own interest has a lot of significance
for design of optimal policies in these settings. Recently, this issue has been addressed by a number
of authors1.  At a broad level one can think of three different approaches to overcome this problem.
One way is to get rid of the supervisors- that is to design incentive schemes such that agent’s
compliance is voluntary. But in all the examples mentioned above it is unlikely that such a policy
can work and intermediate supervisors are an integral part of the enforcement mechanism. The
other end of the spectrum is privatization or more appropriately transfer of the principal-ship to the
supervisor. In that case the supervisor is expected to carry out necessary enforcement in his own
interest. The middle ground is covered by design of various incentive schemes in the form of
reward and punishment for both the agents and the supervisors. In this paper, we shall be focussing
on issues related to these schemes.
 It would be a relatively simple matter if the principal could directly monitor supervisor’s
effort and honesty while enforcing the contract. But, in many cases this is not feasible. Moreover,
given the information and other constraints faced by the principal he may not be able to design
incentive compatible contracts to induce optimal effort and honest behavior by the supervisor. It is
in these contexts that issues of hierarchies and organizational structure assume importance. One
could appoint a higher level supervisor to monitor the original supervisor. Or else, one could have
parallel supervision by more than one supervisor. But the higher level supervisor can be corrupt as
well. Despite the fact that the higher level supervisor is corrupt, such a hierarchy (hiring a thief to
catch a thief) can be optimal in certain cases. We study such structures and characterize the
optimal policy in such situations.
 The paper shows that organizational structure and incentive systems are related. The
optimality (or otherwise) of a particular organizational design depends on the kind of incentive
schemes that are feasible. However, we are not suggesting a theory of organizational structure as
such. In many cases a particular organizational structure might exist for reasons which have
3nothing to do with corruptibility of the supervisors2.  Moreover, the optimal structure depends on
the particular objective of the principal or the planner. For example, whether corruption per se has
any social cost or not can be an important factor in determining the optimal organizational
structure in the present model context.
 Section II introduces a simple model of enforcement. This can be adapted to various
situations like tax evasion, pollution control and other regulatory compliance problems. In section
IIA we focus only on the corruption aspect and consider various organizational structures. It also
contains a brief discussion of the related literature on corruption in hierarchies. Section IIB
introduces effort of the supervisor. This effort can also be interpreted in a broader way so that it
affects various factors like quality of information, likelihood of error and probability of detection.
Since effort is costly for the supervisor, right incentives have to be provided. Section III compares
various organizational structures. The comparative analysis is not quite complete, as it is not
possible to characterize the entire set of outcomes under different structures. The analysis in
sections II-III can be viewed as input based schemes, where supervisor’s effort and honesty can be
viewed as inputs to the final goal of agent’s compliance. A supervisor is rewarded if he reports a
crime. Section IV contains a brief discussion of what we call output based schemes. Here the
supervisor is held responsible for the over all crime levels (final goal) and is compensated
accordingly.
 
II. A MODEL OF ENFORCEMENT
IIA:  CORRUPTION
Consider an individual Z contemplating an illegal activity worth B to him. If he is caught
having committed the crime and reported by the officer then he has to pay a penalty f, f > B. If p is
the probability that he would be caught and punished then he would commit the crime iff
(1) B – pf > 0.
But the corrupt officer can always take a bribe and let him off (do not report). Assuming bribes are
determined by Nash bargaining solution3, Z would have to pay a bribe of f/2. He would now
commit the crime if
(2) B- pf/2 >0.
                                                                                                                                                                    
1
 See Bardhan (1997) for a recent survey.
2
 There are various approaches to the study of organization design, i.e. Radner (92), Sah & Stiglitz (86).
3
 The bribe determination and the basic model setup follows Basu, Bhattacharya and Mishra (92).
4So enforcement is diluted to the extent the officer is corruptible. So long as bribes are some
increasing function of the penalty, enforcement is diluted but not eliminated altogether. In that case
one can argue that by raising the penalty f beyond 2B/p one could achieve compliance.
Suppose fines can not be raised indefinitely (e.g. Limited liability reasons). Say, B/p < f <
2B/p. Then the only way to ensure compliance by Z is to induce honest reporting by the officer.
The officer, to that effect, can be given a reward r for honest reporting. Since the officer can
always collect the reward by reporting after the bribe negotiation with Z has failed; it is proper to
take r as the disagreement payoff of the officer4. Now the bribe to be paid by Z to the officer is
(f+r)/2.  A higher r would mean a higher bribe for Z. So even if honesty is not guaranteed by
introduction of reward, the bribe negotiation becomes more costly. Suppose, r <f, then it can be
checked that the officer will never report honestly. But the individual Z will now commit a crime
only if,
(3) B- p (r+f)/2> 0
Even if f > B/p, if r is substantially less than B/p, then the above inequality can still hold and Z
would benefit from committing the crime. For example, let f = B/p + α and r = B/p - 2α then (3)
would imply that Z still finds it profitable to commit the crime. But comparing the inequalities 1-3,
one can see that some deterrence can be achieved.
As seen in the previous paragraph, if r <f then honest reporting does not take place. In that
case, one can hire another officer to monitor the first officer.  Officer 2 can detect with some
probability  q any bribe taking by officer 1. Now, officer 1 can be subject to a penalty of g for
bribery. This threat of punishment can work to some extent to prevent corruption by officer 1.
However, there is nothing to guarantee that officer 2 will honestly report.  Officer 2 can also take
bribe from officer 1 and decide not to report. The Nash bargaining solution to the bribe negotiation
between the officers will simply be g/2, assuming there is no reward for officer 2.  But this has also
important implications for the bribe negotiations between officer 1 and Z. We assume that Z can
not be tried again after being let off by officer 1 even if the latter is caught.  Bribe to be paid by Z
is now given by t* where t* maximizes  (f-t) (t- qg/2 – r) or,
(4) t* = (f+r)/2  + qg/4
The officer’s net expected payoff from taking a bribe will be given by (f+r)/2 – qg/4. Hence even if
r <f, the officer would choose to be honest if r > f –qg/2. So the introduction of another layer of
                                                       
4
 An earlier version of the paper treated r as an outside option. As has been pointed out by a referee, the
disagreement interpretation is more appropriate. The details are different but the main results do not
change.
5supervision has made bribe taking less attractive even when the second officer is corrupt. Given
that f > B/p, honest reporting would imply compliance by Z.
Instead of having a higher level of monitoring, one can add another layer horizontally. In
many organizations these kind of overlapping jurisdictions is observed. For example, a license or
permit might have to be cleared by several bureaucrats in different ministries. The exact nature of
this overlap depends on the context and can vary. In our setting, both the officers are supposed to
detect illegal activity by Z. If one of them catches Z and reports truthfully, then Z pays the penalty
and the second officer’s action does not matter any more.  However, if the first officer were to take
a bribe and let Z off, then officer 2 could also catch Z and demand a bribe or report truthfully.
Unlike the previous case, when officer 2 is honest and Z is penalized, nothing happens to officer 1
who had taken a bribe earlier. The second officer does not monitor the first officer. We rule out
collusion between the officers although this can have interesting implications.
Whoever is the second officer can get a bribe if Z has not been reported already. Assuming
the same kind of rewards r for honest reporting, the second officer will take bribe of (r+f)/2
whenever r <f. This means the first officer’s bribe is always going to be less. While negotiating
with him, Z knows that an agreement with him does not guarantee complete let off.  If p is the
probability that the second officer can catch Z (after having been caught by officer 1), bribe would
be given by argmax { f – t – p(f+r)/2} {t – r} or,
(5) t* = (f+r)(2-p)/4
This is less than the earlier bribe of (f+r)/2 when p >0. This bribe amount is going to be still less
when officer 2 is expected to report truthfully. Like before, bribe taking is less attractive to the
officer. It is possible to induce honesty even if r <f.
The previous discussion makes it clear that different organizational structures affect the
corruptibility of the officers in different ways. However, it must be pointed out that we are looking
only at the corruption issue and other efficiency issues can be important determinants of the
organization. For example, in the overlapping jurisdiction case, if screening of the project requires
specialized knowledge then such a hierarchy might be optimal, as it would reduce the number of
undesirable projects. On the other hand there might be efficiency loss due to delays and un-
coordinated actions5.
The issue of hierarchies has received some attention in studies on corruption. Basu et al
(92) and Gangopadhaya et al (93) have considered hierarchies of auditors where the higher level
6monitors the lower level. Carillo (95) also considers a similar vertical hierarchy with penalty for
corruption being endogenized by an internal promotion scheme (which is enforced by an honest
super principal). In all these models probabilities of detection are given from outside. However,
these detection probabilities ought to depend, in addition to ratio of criminal-officer population, on
the state of information technology and effort exerted by the officers. Mookherjee and Png (95)
consider a similar model in the context of pollution control, where both effort and honesty decisions
of the inspectors are endogenously determined. But in their model, the principal can always detect
corruption with some probability. In our model language it would mean that the second officer is
always honest and detects bribery with some exogenous probability.  Bac (96), Bag (97) and
D’Souza and Klein(99) consider hierarchies where both monitoring effort and corruption are
endogenously determined, but they restrict attention to vertical case and its variants.  Unlike the
vertical hierarchy case, the horizontal case has not received much attention6. Kofman and Lawarree
(93) examine a case similar to the horizontal case. In their model, the principal hires an external
auditor (in addition to the internal one) and makes inference about the honesty of the internal
auditor based on both reports. But again, the external auditor is supposed to be always honest. In
our model, both effort and honesty of both the officers are endogenously determined. This makes
the model somewhat more complicated and necessitates the use of  simpler specifications. The next
section introduces effort into the model.
IIB.  EFFORT CHOICE
Let p1  be the probability that officer would catch Z. It depends on the amount of effort e1
exerted by the officer 1 as given by the simple function
(6) P1 = e1  / E , P1  ∈  [0   1]  and e1  ∈ [ 0   E]
where E is the maximum effort that an officer can exert.
We assume that utility functions are linear and additively separable. So the officer’s payoff
is given by
(7) Π = y – e, where y is expected net income and includes bribe and  rewards.
The officer can truthfully report and collect the reward r or take a bribe t from individual Z. Bribe t
will depend on the penalties and reward. Officer’s choice of honesty is denoted by h, h ∈ {0 1}. It
will be assumed that h = 0 refer to honest reporting and h = 1 for bribe taking. When indifferent
                                                                                                                                                                    
5
 In a different context, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) have looked at the issue of corruption and
institutional structures like centralized and decentralized modes of delivery of public services.
7between these two options, the officer can randomize. Likewise, Z’s decision to commit the crime
is denoted by c, c∈ {0 1} and c =0 refers to no crime. We shall suppose that c and h stand for
these randomization probabilities as well and interpret these as levels of crime and corruption
respectively. We shall begin with the no-hierarchy case as a benchmark.
In the no-hierarchy case, officer 1 chooses p1 and h to maximize his expected payoff.
Individual chooses c to maximize his payoff. We look for Nash equilibrium which is simply a
vector (c*, e*, h*), so that given the individual’s choice the officer’s payoff is maximized and vice-
versa. The payoffs ( Πz and Π1) in the no-hierarchy case can be given as follows
(8)
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It can be verified that when r < f, the officer always take a bribe and in equilibrium h = 0. To avoid
cases where the officer puts no effort in equilibrium we also assume that E is not too large. More
specifically, E < f/2. The officer will put in positive effort irrespective of the value of the reward.
We can have two kinds of equilibria. If penalty f is small compared to the gain B, then it is
possible that there is an equilibrium with c* = 1, p*1= 1 and h* = 0. But for large penalties, there is
an interior equilibrium with c* = 2E/ (f + r) and, p*1 = 2B / (f+r) and h* = 0. The equilibrium
crime level decreases in f.
Notice that in no case c* = 0, except in the limit when f tends to infinity.  This is not
surprising, since in the absence of any crime the officer is deprived of any reward or bribe income
and hence puts no effort7. So long as officer’s payoff depend on equilibrium crime level in this
fashion such a result will always hold. However, there might be lower bounds on p or e because of
several other reasons. But the general point being made here is that if bribery is sought to be
discouraged this way then the incentive scheme may not be very effective in eliminating crime
altogether.
Before we proceed to analyze different hierarchies, we need to specify some means of
evaluating social welfare. Many different formulations are possible. A minimal version would be to
take welfare as simply dependent on the crime level and the effort costs. According to this,
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 Rose-Ackerman (78) contains an early discussion of this and other hierarchies.
7
 Similar to the result by Marjit and Shi (98 ) who consider more general functions.
8corruption per se does not affect welfare.  Let x be the net social cost associated with the criminal
activity. Then welfare is given by
(9) W = - cx -  p1 E
One can also argue that corruption is a major determinant of welfare and should not be treated
simply as a transfer. Then one can include the relevant cost associated with h in this function.
The third approach would be to bring in revenue considerations as well8. Penalty f and g can be
treated as fines and these constitute revenue to the government. Likewise rewards are payments
made by the government. One can introduce this net revenue of the government (suitably weighted)
in the welfare function.
(10) W = -cx -  p1 E + θ(f-r)cp1h
Where θ is the weight associated with revenue considerations. Corruption also enters the welfare
function because penalty is imposed only when there is honest reporting. This formulation can also
explain why rewards are not raised arbitrarily in many real enforcement situations.  We shall
primarily consider the first version of welfare in making comparisons but also point out how these
comparisons would be affected by introducing revenue constraints.
The social optimum in the no-hierarchy case is easy to see. Welfare is maximized when f is
set at its maximal level. This corresponds to the standard Beckerian maximal fine hypothesis. Such
a result is true as bribes are increasing functions of the fine level. One need not have to induce
honesty, as it would mean setting r above f. Neither welfare criteria discussed above would
prescribe this.
III. HIERARCHY
IIIA.     VERTICAL LAYERS
Let us introduce a second officer who will monitor the first one. As mentioned earlier, we
shall consider a hierarchy where the second officer is only interested  in finding out whether the
first officer has taken a bribe or not9.  Depending on the effort by the second officer; the first
officer can be caught and pays a penalty g if reported. But the second officer can take a bribe as
well and let him off. In fact in our model the second officer is always dishonest. One can consider
the more general case, but since there is no one to monitor the second officer and rewards are less
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 I am grateful a referee for pointing this out. This has the added implication of making bounds on
rewards endogenous.
9
 Throughout the model it is taken that bribery can be detected. Normally however detection of bribery
follows the detection of the initial crime. This aspect has not been modeled. Later in the paper we discuss
this issue in more detail.
9than the penalties, the second officer will always choose to take a bribe. Hence we abstract from
issues like rewards to the second officer for honest reporting.
Let p2   be the probability that the first officer is caught having taken a bribe. Given the
penalty g, he would have to pay a bribe of g/2 if caught. As shown earlier, the bribe he receives
from Z would be (f+r) /2 + p2g/4. Assuming that p2 is determined the same way as p1 in (6), the
payoffs in the vertical hierarchy case are given by
 (11)
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Like the previous case an equilibrium is given by (c*, h*, p*1 and  p*2  ). The only
difference in the present case is the choice of effort by the second officer who optimally chooses his
effort level to maximize his expected income. Clearly, officer 1’s decision depends on 2’s choice.
Since the bribe that individual Z has to pay in the event of getting caught by officer 1 depends on
officer 2’s choice, individual Z’s decision also depends on officer 2’ choice.
Like before, we assume that E is not so high as to make the officers choose zero effort.
Instead of characterizing all the equilibria we shall focus on the interior equilibrium.
Proposition 1:
(a) An equilibrium with positive level of corruption is always dominated by another 
equilibrium with a lower level of corruption.
(b) A zero corruption level, however, need not be optimal when r is constrained to be
small.
Proof: (a) For r > f, corruption is always zero, hence the claim can be verified only when r <
f.  It can be shown that when r < f and E is not too high there exists10 an interior equilibrium where
(12) gB
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 The detailed characterizations of all the equilibria under different parameter specifications have been
omitted and can be obtained from the author.
10
There are two cases to be considered.
Case 1- g can be increased. Recall that the g is the fine that the first officer pays if he is caught
taking a bribe. Consider an equilibrium with h = h*. Now, keeping everything else same raise g. In
the new equilibrium h/ is lower and so is p2 . But c and p1  remain same. The variable h does not
affect the crime level but a lower p certainly would raise welfare according to either of the welfare
criteria as given by (9) and (10).
Case 2 - But in some cases it may not be possible to raise g. For example when the only fine
possible is that of firing, g will refer to the future wage income. In that case g is fixed for our
purpose.
Now corruption can be reduced (h lowered) by either reducing r or f. Reducing r is clearly
not the solution as it raises c and raises p2 as well. So a reduction in r will certainly mean lower
welfare according to the first welfare criterion.  But one can raise r and lower f by a slightly bigger
amount so that rf falls. This means c falls,  p2 falls, but p1 rises. It can be shown that the fall in p2
will compensate for the rise in p1. This would mean such a change would lead to higher welfare.
To see this more formally, consider any equilibrium  with h* > 0. Now consider a change in  r and
f, dr > 0 and df < 0 and in addition dr = - df . Using this once can show that in the new equilibrium,
c is lower, h = h* and (p1 + p2) is also lower (unless f < g/4)11. So this equilibrium clearly
dominates the other one. By continuity, one can consider another pair of r and f with dr< df
such that welfare is higher in the new equilibrium. Clearly for the new equilibrium h < h*.
This completes the proof of the fact that there always exists an equilibrium with higher
welfare and lower corruption12. If we were to use the welfare criterion with revenue consideration,
the proof needs to consider the possible trade off between reduction in crime and reduction in
revenue. For example, if r is lowered crime level is higher but so is payments made by the
government. It is difficult to say which direction welfare will go without further information on x
and θ. Note that this does not imply that any lower corruption equilibrium will welfare dominate
an equilibrium with higher level of corruption. As part B shows if one is constrained in the choice
of the incentive instruments a target of zero corruption is not optimal.
(b) Elimination of corruption would mean h = 0.  This is possible only if, r > f.  When r > f,
we have h = 0, p2 = 0, c = E/r, p1 = B/f. Since r < R, where R is some upper limit for r, f < R.
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 By differentiating (p1 + p2 ) and using the fact that df = -dr we can get, d(p1 + p2 ) = df (4f2 g - Bg2) /
(fg)2 . Since f >B, 4f> g would imply the term on the right hand side is positive.
12
 Mookherjee and Png (95) also have a similar claim. The present one can be considered a generalization
as  officer 2’s effort and honesty are also being determined in equilibrium.
11
Hence welfare is bounded above by  (E/R) x + BE/R.  But we can construct another equilibrium
with r = R but f > r, so that there is some corruption. The value of c remains same. The
enforcement effort now is E(B/f + 2(f-r)/g). One can raise f and g such that this term is less than
E(B/R). Hence by stipulating large fines one can achieve another equilibrium which yields greater
welfare despite positive level of corruption. []
This shows that one need not insist on elimination of corruption all the time and at any
cost. We can use the previous analysis to ask whether an additional layer of supervision is
desirable. The following Proposition shows when it is desirable.
Proposition 2:
A two layered hierarchy is better in welfare terms only when r and f are constrained to be
small and the cost associated with the crime x is large.
Proof: Suppose, r and f are constrained to be such that r + f < 2B. Note that c = 1 irrespective of
whether r > f  or  r < f. So it is optimal to have no enforcement at all and W = -x.
Now by introducing a second layer, one can achieve some compliance c <1, but there is
effort cost as well. Assuming r < f, we have an equilibrium c = E/r, p1 = B/f and p2 = 2(f-r)/g. Now
there is welfare gain of (1-E/r) x due to a reduction of criminal activity but there is welfare loss as
well of the order of (p1 + p2)E. When g can be raised, the second term p2E can be made very small
and one can find a value of x = x* such that for x > x*, (1-E/r) x > (p1 + p2)E. But when g can not
be made large, there still exists x** > x*, such that for x> x** we still have (1-E/r) x > (p1 + p2) E.
In this case, only if the cost of the criminal activity is very large, it is worth having a second
layer.[]
Intuitively, this makes sense.  When the first officer can be punished severely (g large),
limited enforcement can be achieved at a lower cost (p2 is low) and one is more likely to see a
hierarchy. But when the first officer can not be punished severely (g is small), there is need for
greater monitoring (p2  is large) and hence the cost of enforcement is greater. So unless the criminal
activity is a serious one, there is no need for a hierarchical monitoring and hence no enforcement
activity at all.
IIIB: OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION OR HORIZONTAL LAYERS
When more than one officer are supposed to monitor individual Z, the sequence in which Z
is apprehended matters. In many organizations, this sequence might be given from outside. We
simplify our analysis by assuming that both officers have equal probabilities of being the first one
12
to catch Z. Since we shall focus on the symmetric case, where both the officers put in same effort,
it is not such a restrictive assumption. The penalty f, the reward r and the effort-probability
functions are the same. As mentioned earlier, if the first officer reports Z then apprehension by the
second officer does not add anything to the picture.
Let p be the probability that officer I ( I = 1,2) will catch Z.  The probability that Z will be
caught is simply p + (1-p)p and the probability that he will be caught by both is p2 . The
probability that officer I is the first one to catch is p – p2/2. This is because he is the only one to
catch Z with probability (p - p2  ) and he has equal probability of being the first one when Z is
caught by both.
The analysis is straightforward if r > f. Now both of them are honest. However, only one
can get the reward. The payoffs are given by
(13)
fpppB
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Since f > B, the only equilibrium possible is where c* = 2E/r(2-p) and p is given by the function
2p- p2  = B/f.  If we compare this with the vertical hierarchy case, note that if r >f then one does not
need a second layer or second officer’s effort is always zero. So in equilibrium c* = E/r and p =
B/f.  It can be shown that both the crime level and the effort costs are higher in the horizontal case.
Since p > 0, 2E/r(2-p) > E/r. Moreover, 2{1-(1-B/f)1/2 } > B/f.  The main reason behind this is the
duplication of effort by officers in the horizontal case.
A more interesting case emerges when r < f. Now the second officer is always taking a
bribe if the first officer has not already reported. This affects the bribe negotiation between Z and
the first officer. The bribe will be given by
(14)
4)(2)(
]][2)([argmax
* rfprft
rtrfptf
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This means that even if r < f, for certain values of r > r*, the first officer will prefer to report
truthfully and collect reward rather than accept a bribe. This implies that officer’s optimal strategy
regarding truthful reporting depends on whether he is the first one to catch Z or not. Given that
both officers follow the same strategy this would mean in equilibrium Z is always reported honestly
and there is no bribe taking by any officer. The equilibrium outcome is same as the previous case
with r>f.  So even with r < f, one can see complete honest reporting in the horizontal case as
opposed to the vertical case where some bribe taking always takes place. Even though corruption
13
does not per se affect welfare, lower corruption lead to smaller enforcement effort and possibly
higher welfare in this case.
PROPOSITION 3:  There exists an equilibrium where Z is reported honestly even when rewards
are less than the penalty. The equilibrium level of crime is always greater than the level under the
vertical hierarchy (whenever the latter has an interior equilibrium). But the horizontal case welfare
dominates the vertical hierarchy when the cost associated with crime and officer’s penalty g is not
too large.
PROOF:  We shall first show that there exists a r*, given B and f such that for f > r > r*, an
equilibrium with truthful reporting exists. As discussed earlier, if such an equilibrium exists then
the detection probability p will be given by
(14) p = 1-(1-B/f)1/2
Given this p, the expected bribe t to the first officer will be given by
(15) t =  (2-p) (f+r)/4
It can be shown that total expected bribe income will be less than rewards iff
(16) *
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For r ≥ r*, the first officer will always choose to report in equilibrium. Since this equilibrium is
same as the one where both are honest the crime level and effort will be given by
(17) c* = 2E/r(2-p) and e =E{ 1-(1-B/f)1/2}
Comparing this with the vertical case (12), note that since p>0, 2E/r(2-p) > E/r. Hence crime level
is higher. But if g is not too large then the vertical case has higher enforcement cost compared to
the horizontal case. So there is a trade off between enforcement effort and crime control. The
horizontal case dominates the vertical case if the cost savings are greater. We illustrate this point
using an example.
Let B= 15, f = 16, r = 8 and g = 20. Now the critical value of r will be 80/11. So any r ≥8
would mean there would be an honest equilibrium under the horizontal case. Detection probability
p = 3/4.  Using (12)  and the parameter values, it can be shown that the total effort cost under the
vertical case is E(139/80) and total effort cost under the horizontal case is E(6/4). There is a saving
of E(19/80) in the horizontal case. But on the other hand crime level under the horizontal case is
higher by an amount 3E/40.  Using the first welfare function in (9) it is easy to see that the
horizontal case welfare dominates if x < 3. The same would also hold true with (10), because under
the horizontal case there is more honest reporting and hence greater revenue collection.[]
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Note that as g increases the effort cost decreases under the vertical case and the claim
would not hold anymore for sufficiently large g. Likewise, if g is so small that the second layer of
policing  is defunct, the horizontal case may again welfare dominate but for exactly opposite
reasons. Now the horizontal case would have lower crime level but higher enforcement cost. To see
this let g = 8 , r = 7.5 and E = 4.B and f are same as in the previous example. So reward is still
large enough to ensure truthful reporting in the horizontal case. But now, since g is very low, there
is no interior equilibrium under the vertical case. In fact for the parameter values it can be verified
that c = 1 = h = p1 , p2 = 0.  So there is no deterrence of crime. In that case it is better to have no
enforcement at all under the vertical case. But, the horizontal case does succeed in reducing the
crime level for the same parameter values. If the gain from crime reduction outweighs the
enforcement cost, then the horizontal case is better. It is better in terms of both welfare criteria,
because it achieves positive enforcement as well as honest reporting. This suggests the following
corollary.
Corollary:  When the reward and penalty for the officer are small so that no enforcement is
possible under the vertical case, the horizontal case can achieve positive enforcement. If the cost
associated with crime is substantial then it may be the preferred organizational structure.
IV: OTHER INCENTIVE SCHEMES
Recall that in the vertical hierarchy model, officer 2 is simply supposed to monitor officer
1 to detect bribery. This is unsatisfactory on two accounts. First, it assumes that there is a simple
and direct way to detect bribery- a feature shared by  most of the literature. Second,  given that
bribery per se  is not the target variable, a natural case to consider would be to have the second
officer monitor Z as well.  Once Z’s illegal act is detected, then both Z and the officer 1 are
penalized.  Detection  of Z’s illegal activities by officer 2 (but not reported by officer1)  could be
taken as evidence of bribery by officer 1. As has been noted by Mookherjee and Png (95), this
would strengthen officer 1’s incentive to put higher effort. This arrangement has features of both
the vertical and horizontal cases. This however has serious implications when the monitoring
technology is not prefect because officer 1 can get penalized despite best efforts and honesty
simply because of his failure to detect Z’s activities.
A logical extension of this argument would be to compensate the officer solely in terms of
the final outcome – the extent of criminal activities. This would also take care of the problem and
an unpleasant feature of all these models that reward income vanishes when there is no illegal
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activities. To fix ideas, consider an example of pollution by two firms. The regulator can observe
the aggregate level of pollution but can not regulate individual firm’s behavior based on aggregate
information. Hence a pollution inspector is hired to monitor the firms. In the case of identical firms,
the inspector will report truthfully to the regulator if both firms choose c = 0 or c = 1. But for all
other intermediate cases, scope for bribery exists. The inspector can take a bribe from the polluting
firm to misreport or take a bribe from the non-polluting firm to file a true report.  This kind of
extortion or harassment would be a major problem13. If  suitable institutional and incentive
schemes could be put in place to overcome the problem of extortion, then the inspector will always
report truthfully. One such case is when firms can present hard evidence to prove non-pollution and
the inspector can then be penalized for false reports.
These kind of schemes can be viewed as output based as compensation depends on the
outcome of monitoring. This has interesting implications for the effort choice of the officers. If all
agents were to choose c = 0, then the officer is getting maximum rewards possible and there is no
need to put any effort.  But without any effort detection probabilities would be low and agents
might be induced to choose c> 0 again. In fact in multi-stage settings, the officer would have an
incentive to put high effort and maintain the reputation of high effort and  honesty.  This reputation
can deter agents from choosing high c and consequently lowering officer’s income.  Notice that in
all the input based models studied  earlier, the reputation effect is exactly the opposite. The officer
would like the agents to believe that he is a low effort and corrupt person so that more agents
would be induced to choose c = 1 and the officer can get a high bribe or reward income.  Hence,
the incentive scheme in use can have dramatic implications for the officer’s effort-honesty choice.
In the paper, we focussed on only one kind of scheme and its various instruments and how they
affect the officer’s choices. The study of the output based schemes is left for future research.
V: CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that organizational design and the optimal policy towards corruption
matter most when there are constraints on penalties and rewards.  The desirability of a particular
organizational structure (no hierarchy, vertical hierarchy or overlapping jurisdiction)  is context
specific and depends on the nature of the crime (its cost x), the bounds on rewards and penalties (f,
g) and the weight of corruption in social welfare.  In general, the horizontal structure leads to less
                                                       
13
 Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (99) study the problem in  a tax evasion and audit context.
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corruption. In the vertical case, there is greater amount of corruption in equilibrium  though the
overall  level of illegal activities (c) might be lower.
The effort choice of the officer has been one of the main focuses of our analysis. The
monitoring effort is but only one component of the enforcement process. One can consider other
factors like investment in human capital, learning and information gathering on the part of the
officer. Jointly, these factors determine how efficient the enforcement process is. Greater efficiency
would imply fewer criminals  going undetected and unpunished; and fewer innocent individuals
being wrongly apprehended and bearing avoidable costs. The second aspect of efficiency has not
been dealt in the paper as it would require a separate  treatment on its own14.
Moreover, given the static nature of the model many interesting issues like reputation
building, optimal length of agent-supervisor relationships can not be addressed here. Incentive
schemes of the types discussed in section IV also need further investigation
                                                       
14
 Mishra (97) show how this could lead to  multiple equilibria. Efficient officer and small criminal
population on one hand and inefficient officer and large criminal  population oon the other arise as
equilibria in  a model with the same parameter values.
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